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The Role of the European Jurist Before and After the Statalisation of Law

The Role of the European Jurist Before and After the Statalisation of Law

MischaOctober 13, 202612 min read
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This article aims to provide a brief overview of the role of the jurist in civil law countries and continental Europe in preserving the prestige of the legal profession following the statalisation of law through a redefinition of the concept of ius.

Due to the complex interaction between legal positivism – the idea that only that which is produced by the sovereign authority effectively carries coercive force, while every other source, including custom, morality, values, and the jurist’s considerations, operates only within the sphere tolerated by that authority – and the emergence of the nation-state as a bureaucratic apparatus conceived as the only “entity” legitimately entitled to produce law, legal culture at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries underwent an unprecedented revolution. As a result, the role of the jurist was relegated to the background.

The causes of this phenomenon are, as noted, many and complex. For this reason, we shall focus solely on the means through which the jurist came to reassert, with varying degrees of success depending on the context, his legitimacy as the sole possessor of the technical competences – conceived in strictly elitist terms – necessary to harmonise parliamentary legislation (for Rousseau and numerous French Enlightenment thinkers, the sole true expression of the will of society as a whole), diverse and multifaceted local legal cultures, by then in marked decline but constituting an ineliminable heritage sedimented in the very being of a people (von Savigny), and, finally, the values of the European legal-political tradition as a bulwark defending “natural rights” (Portalis) and freedom understood as a metapositive concept, that is, one grounded in foundations that precede law in the strict sense. This interweaving of law, morality, and religion was characteristic of Roman law and, subsequently, of medieval law, in which a separation between these domains was simply inconceivable.

It thus becomes immediately apparent that the work of many nineteenth-century jurists consisted in claiming a sphere of legitimacy for alternative sources of law and challenging the idea that the entire legal culture that preceded the emergence of the centrality of the State was “irrational,” notwithstanding the fact that each of them was motivated by different considerations.

To understand the significance of this development, it is useful to take a step back and consider, by way of example, the actual weight carried by the jurist within Renaissance legal culture in the process of harmonising – and, at times, creating – law (ius). The Veronese jurist Bartolomeo Cipolla, born in 1420 and highly active in political affairs, was, in fact, able to rule in favour of the Modenese guild of wool merchants when its members refused to obey a statute issued by the Duke of Ferrara. The jurist thus had the task of disentangling the complex web of rules and conflicts between different hierarchical ranks by making use of metajuridical concepts such as aequitas or bonitas. This example shows clearly that the final word on what actually constituted “law” in the modern sense ultimately rested, albeit with the necessary exceptions, not with a more or less monopolistic political body endowed with clearly defined procedures, but rather with a complex interaction of maxims, precepts, legislative norms, and values, whose harmonisation was the work of the jurist.

As noted above, however, this situation changed with the emergence of the modern State. Local rights, by then deprived, for some, of the legitimacy conferred by “reason” and, for others, of that deriving from democratic consent expressed in parliamentary form, were almost entirely abolished in France and, much later, in Germany and Italy. Consequently, the jurist lost his clarifying function, and the judge became a mere bouche de la loi (Montesquieu), whose sole task, according to Beccaria, was to apply the general rule syllogistically to the concrete case, without external influences or ethical considerations.

For some, the destruction of this European legal heritage constituted a serious threat to the most fundamental requirements of social life and opened the way to the emergence of a Leviathan devoid of external limitations, which could therefore assert itself across all areas of individual life without any genuine counterbalancing force.

One of the first to articulate this concern was Tocqueville, who saw in civil society, guided by a cultivated aristocracy, the only restraint upon the excessive power of the State and the guardian of individual liberty. Limited government, in this view, was possible through the counterbalancing of the State by a strong society capable of positively directing individuals. This idea would later be shared by the German Ordoliberals, who regarded the State’s task as the “construction” of a liberal society rather than the promulgation of strong rules aimed at controlling the lives of individuals. Thus, notwithstanding the important differences in their respective understandings of the meaning of “freedom,” an appeal to metapositive values emerges – an appeal that had been a distinguishing feature of premodern legal thought. For liberal jurists, therefore, the weakness of the State was a necessity rather than an obstacle.

Others, however, such as J. S. Mill, while in a certain sense following Tocqueville, adopted an elitist conception of government in opposition to forms of direct democracy. According to this view, political power could not be guided and controlled by a majority lacking the cultural and intellectual qualities suited to the task, but had instead to be entrusted to the most capable individuals who, although selected through universal suffrage, would govern in an autonomous and independent manner. In an analogous manner, although for entirely different reasons, Kant expressed a similar view, placing theoretical reflection on the principles of equality, justice, and freedom well above the will of the people and treating it as the true matrix of law.

The most systematic and conceptual response to the emergence of national codes as substitutes for local rights, or for Law understood as a product of reason, nevertheless came from the Begriffsjurisprudenz, or jurisprudence of concepts, developed through the work of Puchta and, above all, Friedrich von Savigny. Savigny entered into a polemic with another German jurist, Thibaut, of the school of positive law, who proposed providing Germany with a unified civil code – a project that was subsequently realised.

Savigny’s polemic begins from an important premise: law, just like the people from which it originates, is not a static reality that can be crystallised through universal, undifferentiated norms produced by a “reason” without place or time. Rather, both function like living organisms. One can see here the influence of the growing importance of the empirical sciences across the cultural fields of the period and, in this particular case, of biology. Law and the people from which it originates evolve dynamically: they mature and decline according to internal processes governed by logics that are themselves internal and cannot be abstracted. They consequently lose their force when analysed and modified through universal and generalised means.

Savigny therefore held that the law of the German people was Volksrecht – the law of the people – that is, a body of norms, customs, and rules of conduct sedimented through history. This body of law responded to the nature of the German people and developed together with it in an interdependent manner, thereby conferring enormous importance upon custom, which legalism intended to annihilate completely. It is at this point that the role of the jurist, fundamental for Savigny, comes into play. As a fine interpreter of that very spirit and of the norms in which it lives, the jurist has the task of systematising – using the normative categories of the legal tradition and the acquisitions of logical science – the particular rules into a pyramid of concepts that provides a systematic and rational explanation of the particular legal reality without apparently claiming to reform it abstractly.

Perhaps paradoxically, the work of this school would subsequently provide the legal categories adopted by the great liberal codifications. There was, however, an important difference from what occurred, for example, in the project of the Jacobins: it was the jurist who played the central role in normative creation, rather than a legislative apparatus that expressed, more or less directly, the will of the people.

Another path through which the jurist preserved the tradition of legal thought was that of synthesis. Portalis, drafter of the Code Civil (or Code Napoléon), presented his work as doubly legitimised. On the one hand, the code emerged as the rational conclusion of the reflection of learned jurists, from the Romanist tradition through to the Enlightenment; on the other, it appeared as the concretisation of the volonté générale elaborated by the legislative body representing popular demands. Once again, the jurist emphasised the centrality and indispensability of his own role, but this time without opposing the inevitable supremacy of parliamentary law. In the school of exegesis, of which Portalis was a representative, positive law, legislation, and metapositive categories such as that of natural law were treated as one and the same.

For a long time, and particularly between the middle of the nineteenth century and the Second World War, the supremacy of law remained, for the most part, unquestioned. Illuminating in this regard is the work of Hans Kelsen, the foremost representative of the positivist school, for whom law was a closed system legitimised solely by constituent power and did not permit interaction with other fields of knowledge and human life, such as morality, religion, or ethnic and historical particularities.

The situation changed following the experience of totalitarianism. The need was once again felt to place restraints upon the State’s abuse of power and to find a point of equilibrium between positive law and concrete reality, morality, and society. It was precisely in this context that the first constitutions emerged as the product of this realisation, re-legitimising the role of the jurist, who erected impassable barricades against the constant and potentially unlimited process of legislation. Constitutional jurists placed constitutional principles hierarchically above parliamentary or governmental legislation, “sacralising” principles such as subjective rights – concepts again strongly influenced by morality and by the concrete experience of social existence – which, in the experience of post-war Europe, served to claim for the individual a sphere of autonomy, freedom, and independence from the power of the State.

The limitations to which the latter is subject in the contemporary liberal experience are the product, though certainly not exclusively, of a centuries-long endeavour to preserve the European legal tradition, with all its diversities, undertaken by the class of jurists.

This tension is far from exhausted today. There is an emerging need to rethink the interaction between the legislative and doctrinal formants at a time of serious crisis in constitutional legitimacy. During this period, the demands of multiculturalism, together with the general sense of insecurity and distrust regarding the future that pervades the Old Continent, seem to call into question the legitimacy of Constitutional Charters that are apparently too rigid and incapable of adequately guiding legislation. At the same time, legislation is becoming increasingly redundant and omnipresent in its effort to meet the growing needs of society, while also becoming increasingly swayed by political currents whose projects remain unfinished and incapable of providing society with a sensible direction.

Mischa

Mischa

Guest Writer

Ave Europa Italy

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