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The Limits of Charismatic Authority: Lessons for the Populist Right

The Limits of Charismatic Authority: Lessons for the Populist Right

LucasOctober 8, 202616 min read
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The “system,” the “regime,” the “status quo,” or whatever one wants to call the contemporary political order of the West is, in essence, mass democracy in routinised form. Mass democracy, as a social, political, and economic form of organisation, has been routinised and rationalised to such an extent that it has ceased to appear as a particular political programme. Instead, it has become part of the general worldview of contemporary democratic man. Its institutions, assumptions, categories, and expectations have been absorbed into the ordinary functioning of political and social life. What was historically contingent has consequently come to appear natural.

This is important because the contemporary order is not reproduced merely through formal institutions. It is reproduced through the ordinary practices by which individuals participate in political and social life. A person working within an institution, or participating in society more generally, becomes integrated into it not primarily through external coercion, but through repeated participation in its practices. The language, categories, rituals, procedures, and norms that organise institutional and social life are gradually incorporated into the individual’s own mode of apprehension. They cease to appear as external structures and instead become part of the background against which the world is perceived and interpreted. The individual does not merely hold the assumptions of an institution or society; those assumptions become sedimented in the structure of experience itself.

Political orders are therefore reproduced at a level deeper than explicit political belief. The average participant in mass democracy does not necessarily experience himself as following a particular ideology. He simply experiences social-political reality through categories that have already been constituted by the existing order. Certain distinctions appear obvious, certain institutions legitimate, certain forms of authority natural, and certain political possibilities reasonable or absurd before any conscious political judgement has taken place.

This also explains why one cannot simply persuade a person whose political understanding has been formed within such a structure. The difficulty is not necessarily that such a person is incapable of responding to rational – or other – argument. Rather, argument itself is encountered from within an already constituted field of intelligibility. What appears to one person as a strong argument can appear to another as irrelevant, incoherent, or even unintelligible because the two do not apprehend the object through the same conceptual and normative structure. The problem is therefore not merely that there are competing views, but that there are competing “modes of seeing.”

If genuine political transformation is to take place, then, it cannot consist solely in persuading individuals to adopt different conclusions or worldviews. It must involve a transformation of the practices, categories, and forms of life through which those conclusions become intelligible in the first place. What must ultimately change is therefore not merely what individuals think, but the apparatus through which individuals – and, through them, institutions and society as a whole – apprehend the world.

It is from this perspective that the prospects of any serious, long-term right-wing victory become clearer. Let us assume, for a moment, that the conventional “right-wing populist” parties actually operate outside the mass democratic paradigm in a substantial manner – which, to a large extent, they do not. Even then, those challenging the existing order necessarily operate upon a political and conceptual terrain different from that occupied by the parties that produced and sustain it. The conventional “liberal,” “conservative,” and social democratic parties of the West differ relatively little at their ideological core because they operate within a common institutional and conceptual horizon. The populist right must therefore do more than challenge the reigning order electorally.

There is already an implicit recognition of this in the way the populist right challenges the existing system through charismatic rather than established authority. Figures such as Trump, Weidel, Lowe, and Le Pen derive – or derived – a significant portion of their political legitimacy from their capacity to deliver strong rhetoric, embody opposition, and present themselves not merely as representatives of an existing political order but as potential transformers of it.

This form of authority possesses an obvious political advantage because it allows the populist leader to position himself outside the established institutional order; while simultaneously claiming to represent a political community that those institutions have ceased to represent. The leader becomes the concrete embodiment of an opposition that cannot itself be institutionalised. Political legitimacy is consequently transferred from established procedures and institutions towards the person who claims to stand against them.

Yet this strength contains the seeds of a fundamental problem. As the past decade has shown, rhetoric is not a strategy for governing. Once these movements enter power, they encounter a political world radically different from that of the campaign trail and the soapbox. They immediately confront entrenched administrative, bureaucratic, and institutional structures established by the older parties, which cannot simply be displaced by an act of political will. The machinery of the state is embedded in procedures, personnel, legal norms, and institutional habits that may take years, if not decades, to transform.

This is not merely a structural problem, for there is also an intrinsic tension between charismatic and formal-legal rule. In its pure form, charismatic authority does not derive its legitimacy from abstract and impersonal procedure. Its validity rests upon the qualities of the leader and the recognition granted to him by those who follow him. It therefore tends to reject the idea that political legitimacy is exhausted by inherited institutional forms. The charismatic-populist conception of political legitimacy derives political order from concrete experience, personal authority, and collective will rather than from an "autonomous" system of formal rules.

The populist is thus “revolutionary” in a quite specific sense. He seeks to transvalue the existing order – to break through inherited legalistic and institutional forms in order to establish what he deems to be a new political substance. His authority is derived precisely from the claim that existing institutions are incapable of expressing the political will – or general needs – of the people.

But a political order cannot remain permanently revolutionary. Once political power has been acquired, the movement must cease merely to negate the existing order and begin to produce a new one. The charismatic leader can transvalue existing values, but victory and entry into power create a new set of problems. A political order must eventually convert personal authority into institutions, procedures, personnel, and law. What begins as a politics of personal decision must eventually become a system capable of reproducing political decisions independently of the person who first embodied them.

This is the fundamental problem of routinisation.

The question, therefore, is not whether a populist movement can create institutions – for it obviously can. Nor is it whether it can change constitutions, administrative structures, personnel, electoral systems, or the distribution of political power – for it can do that as well. The more difficult question is whether the political principle embodied by the charismatic movement can become sufficiently autonomous from the charismatic leader to reproduce itself after he leaves office.

The distinction is therefore not between institutionalised and non-institutionalised “populism,” but between institutions that depend upon the continued exercise of charismatic authority and institutions capable of reproducing a political order independently of it. It is precisely here that the populist right has struggled and failed.

In some countries, like Finland, right-wing populist parties have become increasingly integrated into the existing party system. The Finns Party has been able to influence and work with the “centre-right” and, at times, the “centre” as well. Yet electoral and ideological normalisation has not produced a corresponding transformation of the bureaucratic and administrative apparatus. The older parties remain those that, in a deeper institutional sense, “possess” much of the infrastructure through which the state operates.

The case of Fidesz in Hungary after 2010 illustrates the problem quite well. In 2010, Fidesz achieved a parliamentary majority that enabled it to revise the Hungarian constitutional order, with the previous constitution having largely remained in place since the communist era. Fidesz consequently began a constitutional and institutional transformation of Hungary. In this sense, Fidesz succeeded in “institutionalising itself.”

But what, precisely, was institutionalised?

Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary developed something resembling a soft plebiscitary-Caesarist form of rule. Personal authority, electoral legitimation, and permanent political antagonism against perceived enemies, both inside and outside the country, became central mechanisms of political organisation. Fidesz succeeded in constructing an extensive institutional apparatus, but the political principle underlying that apparatus remained substantially dependent upon the continued exercise of Orbán’s personal authority. It is here that the transformation remained incomplete. Fidesz did not fail to construct institutions; it failed to make those institutions sufficiently autonomous from the charismatic source of political authority that had produced them.

This distinction is important because an institutional order can be extensive without being fully routinised in the manner sketched out at the start of this essay. It can possess a constitution, laws, administrative structures, political parties, economic networks, and established procedures while remaining dependent upon discretionary political decision at its centre. Such a system has institutions, but those institutions do not yet constitute an autonomous principle of political reproduction.

As a result, Fidesz operated within a peculiar tension. It transformed the formal architecture of the Hungarian state while simultaneously maintaining a political form in which the ultimate coherence of that architecture remained dependent upon Orbán. The system was therefore neither simply a continuation of the old order nor a fully autonomous new order. It was a new institutional structure whose political substance remained tied to the authority of the person who had “created” it.

This dependence upon charismatic authority was also tied to Fidesz’s mode of political mobilisation. The friend-enemy distinction became a primary means of mobilisation because permanent antagonism provided one of the principal mechanisms through which the movement could reproduce its political identity. Yet permanent mobilisation creates a problem of its own. The more thoroughly an order becomes established, the more difficult it becomes to sustain the sense of political rupture upon which its original legitimacy depended.

The “revolutionary movement” must therefore continually present itself as revolutionary even after it has become established. Orbán’s increasingly explicit presentation of Hungary as a “conservative bastion” and as a political counterweight to the "liberal" order of the West illustrates precisely this problem.

This, however, produces an inherent exhaustion. The political order can no longer derive its legitimacy from overthrowing the existing system because it has itself become the system. Its very success undermines the conditions under which its original charismatic legitimacy was generated. The friend-enemy distinction consequently becomes increasingly difficult to sustain as an existential principle of mobilisation. The movement must continue to present itself as the defender of a threatened political community even as it becomes increasingly identified with the institutions of political power themselves.

Fidesz thus occupied an unstable position between charismatic mobilisation and institutional permanence. Its institutional transformation was substantial, but its political reproduction remained excessively dependent upon the continued exercise of political authority. What initially appeared as the strength of the regime therefore became, over time, a source of institutional vulnerability.

This vulnerability becomes clear in the question of succession. An institutional order whose ultimate political coherence continually depends upon discretionary decision at the centre remains vulnerable when that centre changes. Once the authority that originally unified the system loses its capacity to mobilise, the institutions remain, but the principle that gave them coherence becomes “uncertain.”

Peter Magyar inherited, in many respects, the political form developed by Fidesz: personalist, plebiscitary, and organised around a “populist friend-enemy distinction.” The political content was different, but the form was very similar. This demonstrates something important about the failure to routinise a political order: it does not necessarily destroy the order. Instead, it can leave behind an institutional apparatus that remains available for appropriation by another charismatic authority.

The political form survives even when the political person changes. In this sense, the portability of the Fidesz system was a testament to its incompleteness. If the institutional order can be easily appropriated by a new charismatic actor, then the institutions have not yet become an autonomous principle of political reproduction.

The fundamental problem of the populist right, then, is not simply how to win power, nor even how to transform institutions once power has been acquired. It is how to transform charismatic victory into institutional continuity. The Trump administration is a case in point.

The “revolutionary moment” can displace an existing order, but it cannot, by itself, constitute a new one. Charisma must eventually become administration; decision must eventually become law; and political will must eventually acquire an institutional form capable of surviving the person or persons who first embodied it.

Yet even this is not sufficient; for the creation of functioning institutions is only the intermediate stage of political transformation. A durable political order requires institutions that are experienced as legitimate, practices that become habitual, and political categories that become sufficiently internalised that the order no longer needs to be continually imposed from above. The new political substance must become part of the ordinary consciousness of the people who inhabit it.

This brings us back to the problem with which we began.

The existing mass democratic order is powerful precisely because it has ceased to appear as a particular political project. Its categories have become ordinary; its institutions familiar; its assumptions shape the horizon of expectation of society. It does not need to continually persuade individuals of its legitimacy because its legitimacy is already incorporated into the ordinary practices through which political and social life is experienced.

A movement that seeks to replace such an order must therefore accomplish considerably more than electoral victory. It must not merely capture institutions or alter laws. It must produce an alternative political order whose institutions, practices, categories, and assumptions can become equally ordinary.

This is ultimately where the two problems – the problem of mass democracy and the problem of populist routinisation – meet. The first concerns how an existing political order becomes sedimented into ordinary experience; the second concerns how a movement seeking to replace that order can itself become sedimented into ordinary experience.

The ultimate task of the populist right is consequently not simply to acquire power, but to make its political principles habitual. What begins as charismatic rupture must become political ethos. Pathos must become ethos; personal authority must become institutional authority; political decision must become law and practice; and the exceptional moment of mobilisation must become an ordinary form of political life. Only then does the movement cease to be merely a movement.

This is, of course, not to say that the above constitutes a formula for “total victory.” It merely describes the “prerequisites” for long-term sustainability. The underlying truth is that a collective of whatever kind preserves itself through the mutual antagonism of its parts, each pursuing its own growth. In a "capitalist" society, those parts are individual – primarily economic – agents; even when they act within organisations, they do so in pursuit of their own material or ideal interests. Their contribution to the whole is therefore largely an “unintended” by-product of those pursuits. If the system were transformed into one of “socialism,” the constellation of interests would not disappear; it would merely change the means through which those interests are pursued. The underlying antagonism of social existence cannot simply be abolished. Were struggle to disappear altogether, the result would not be some “stable” form of “preservation,” of dissolution. For what endures is not the system as a fixed structure, but the ongoing process of contestation through which it is continually produced and renewed.

Placing one’s faith in a leader is to place one’s faith in the visible expression of a process while remaining, more or less, blind to the underlying conditions that produced it. A leader does not emerge in a vacuum, nor does he represent the collective by virtue of some quality inherent in himself. He is the "contingent" expression of a particular constellation of interests, antagonisms, and material conditions. To invest one’s faith in him, therefore, is to mistake the surface for the movement beneath it – to mistake the temporary crystallisation of social forces for the forces themselves.

This is not to say that leaders are unimportant. They plainly represent and give form to a particular aspect of collective will. The problem arises when one mistakes that representation for the source of the movement itself, or when one seeks salvation purely in another person. The leader may embody a movement, but he does not – especially today – constitute the conditions that make the movement possible. To place one’s faith entirely in him is therefore to surrender one’s understanding of the process to its most visible expression.

Lucas

Lucas

Founder

Ave Europa Finland

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